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Abstract
With the extension of its competence for social policy legislation in the Maastricht and
Amsterdam treaties, the EU has adopted a significantly new social dimension in the past ten
years. According to the Copenhagen criteria, the CEEC candidate countries have to adopt the
former via the acquis communautaire. This paper discusses the effect of an adoption of this
EU social law on future labor market performance in the CEECs. For this purpose, we model
and investigate the impact of institutional uncertainty (and of its elimination) on job creation
and job destruction in the CEEC candidate countries. We conclude that structural change on
CEEC labor markets tends to be fostered via reducing institutional uncertainty. However,
these kinds of benefits of the adoption of the acquis have to be weighed against the danger
that the adoption of inefficient EU social and labor policy regulations imposed by the acquis
might also entail significant risks for employment in the CEECs similar to those which have
materialized in the former EU. This rather pessimistic view can be substantiated based on a
public choice analysis of why the old EU members will want to impose the Social Charter
even though it will harm the new members. These risks consist of a significant increase in
hiring and firing costs and of higher wage rates. Based on a simple option value analysis, we
investigate and evaluate the trade-off between lower institutional uncertainty and higher
employment costs induced by the adoption of the acquis.
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1. Introduction
Market economy rules are urgently required in Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) in order to eliminate the prevailing institutional, i.e. legal, uncertainty which
currently restrains investment. Consequently, the transfer of a set of rules such as the acquis
communautaire as a prerequisite for their EU entry might be justified if we interpret it as a
reliable obligation and as a commitment to the transformation process (Baldwin et al. 1997,
pp. 169 ff.; Kohler 1999, p. 2). While it took the EU approximately 50 years to establish these
institutions, the CEECs are required to realize this transformation in just a few years in order
to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria (Martens 2000, p. 3). Hence, an institutional peg like the
adoption of the acquis communautaire seems to make sense.
On the other hand, a counteracting effect results from the fact that the adoption of the acquis
will tend to increase hiring and firing costs and wage rates in the new EU member countries.
This assumption is based on our analysis of EU social policy. Since its beginnings in 1992
there have been numerous regulations enacted that create seriously employment-endangering
labor market rigidities. At the same time they are protecting the employed insiders from the
‘rich’ EU-countries against the competition by employees from the ‘poorer’ member
countries.
We model and investigate the impact of institutional uncertainty (and of its elimination),
increasing labor markets rigidities and increasing wages on job creation and job destruction in
the CEEC candidate countries. In our model, non-linearities in the relation between
employment in the CEECs and its explaining variables like firm revenues and wages are
emphasized. A potential mechanism based on a band of inaction that is induced by sunk costs
and could account for a ‘weaker’ relationship between employment and its determinants is
augmented by institutional uncertainty. As a result of option value effects the band of inaction
is widened and, thus, hysteresis effects are strongly amplified by uncertainty. Conversely, the
adoption of the acquis is shown to weaken hysteresis effects on the CEEC labor markets, at
least as the elimination of institutional uncertainty is taken into account. However, one has to
work on the assumption that rigidities increase. Ceteris paribus, the latter leads to a widening
of the ‘band of inaction’ and, thus, preserves given structures. However, it cannot be
determined a priori which effect dominates. The probable increase of the wage costs effects
an upward movement of the band of inaction. This means an amplification of job-destruction,
but at the same time a mitigation of job-creation. Moreover, it elucidates the danger of a
“Mezzogiorno” respectively of a “German unification” effect, i.e. a strong decline of jobs and
high unemployment induced by excessive wage costs.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the following chapter we give evidence for the assumption
that the increase in EU social legislation since 1992 reduces labor markets adjustment
capabilities. In chapter 3 we outline the basic model of job destruction and creation based on
the option value of waiting. In chapter 4 the scenario of EU Eastern Enlargement is analyzed– 2 –
for impacts on job creation and job destruction. In chapter 5 the results are illustrated by
calculating a simple numerical example. In chapter 6 we summarize our conclusions.
2. Labor market effects of the adoption of the EU’s social policy
2.1 The legal status of the European Social Policy
The “Treaty Establishing the European Community” (ECT) of October 2
nd 1997 clearly
applies to “fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter
signed at Turin on 18
th October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental
Social Rights of Workers” (Article 136 ECT). By means of Article 136 ECT two reliable
sources of the EU social policy are specified. First, the European Social Charter of 1961 is an
agreement between the members of the Council of Europe, which has been signed by 32 EU
member states and has been ratified by 26 to date. An extended version was passed on May
3
rd 1996 in Strasbourg and has been signed in the meantime by 32 countries and ratified by
15.1 Since in both contracts a derogation right is explicitly intended with respect to the
acceptance of individual principles and the Council of Europe does not have any serious
competence of sanctions against its members at its disposal, an analysis of the total package,
as it is done by Boeri et al. (1998), p. 92, seems to be hardly meaningful.2 Second, on
December 9
th 1989 in Strasbourg a “Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers” was passed as a declaration. This so-called EU Social Charter was not signed by
the United Kingdom, reducing the meaning of this charter further to symbolic significance.
Although the United Kingdom announced to sign the Charter in 1998 in the wake of the
election of Tony Blair, it has not yet put this decision into practice. Consequently, neither the
European Social Charter nor the EU Social Charter appear to be the relevant governance
arrangements for the detailed analysis of the EU social policy, even though the wording of the
ECT explicitly refers to them.
But the EU social charter is nonetheless important, because it can be seen as a starting point
as well as a target agreement for EU social policy. Before the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty, an “Agreement on Social Policy” was passed – again without the United Kingdom –
which expressed the intend to implement the EU Social Charter based on the acquis
(preamble). This agreement was ratified and integrated in the “Maastricht Treaty on European
Union” (TEU) by means of the “Protocol on Social Policy” on February 7
th 1992. By this
unique construction of law the areas of competence of the Community with respect to social
policy were expanded without validity for the U.K. (Heise 1998, p. 12). After the election of
                                                
1 All ten EU candidates from Central and Eastern Europe are members of the Council of Europe and have
either signed the Social Charter of 1961, of 1996 or both. See
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm.
2 Particularly, the authors predominantly refer to the version of 1996 which is not mentioned in the ECT (see
Boeri et al. 1998, p. 92).– 3 –
Tony Blair in 1997, the U.K. declared its willingness to support the common social policy.
Since the signing of the “Treaty of Amsterdam” on October 2
nd 1997, by which the
“Agreement on Social Policy” was integrated into the ECT (Article 136) largely word-for-
word with only a few modifications, all social policy resolutions of the EU are again valid for
all EU member states to the same extent and “the social chapter (…) is now integral to the
EU’s constitutional acts” (Lavigne 1998, p. 41, Feldmann 1999, p. 670).
Therefore, although the important step concerned the legal changes wrought by the Treaty of
Amsterdam, the legal status of EU social policy is defined by the social chapter of the ECT.
The social chapter is the tool to implement the social charter. In other words, although the
social charter is non-binding yet it is nevertheless important for EU labor markets (today and
in the future).
2.2 The new dimension of the EU’s social policy
The area of legislative competence of the EU with concerning social policy has been enlarged
by the Protocol on Social Policy and the Social Chapter of the Treaty of Amsterdam in several
fields (Article 137 ECT). As a result, the EU now has new possibilities to enact restrictions of
freedom of action in individual employment contracts by directives. Before 1992, this was
possible only in a rather limited area, mostly in the fields of safety at work and of conditions
for workers moving within the Community. It is of special significance in regard to the topic
of our paper that the EU provides for the inclusion of unions and employers’ associations in
social legislation.
It is pointed out frequently that the workers’ and employers’ organizations up to now have no
rights for collective bargaining on the level of the EU. This view can be confuted with regard
to Article 4 (1) Protocol on Social Policy respectively Article 139 (1) ECT.3 However, it can
be demonstrated that these agreements will be non-binding for third parties which are non-
members of the parties to the contract. This means that the realization of the bargaining results
is not at all guaranteed. Once more, the validity of this view can be quickly rejected: the
workers’ and employers’ associations are granted for the first time the possibility to transform
their agreements in the (enlarged) area of legislative competence of the EU into council
directives on the basis of Article 4 (2) social protocol respectively Article 139 (2) ECT.4
Consequently, the prospect that national social standards will quickly become hardly
reversible international rules, if this is pushed forward by supranational collective pressure
groups can be assessed as rather high. Under the condition of a resolution of the Council of
Ministers, these agreements become binding also for third parties which are non-members of
the parties to the contract. A further serious objection could be that the responsibility for
                                                
3 “Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Community level may lead to
contractual relations, including agreements.” [Art. 139 (1) ECT].
4 Beginning in 1996 this happened several times so far.– 4 –
reaching wage agreements with respect to working conditions is now wholly ascribed to the
Council of Ministers and the Commission. One possible effect will be the standardization of
working conditions in the EU.
Since 1992, the EU Commission passed several directives and regulations, based on its
enlarged competencies. For purposes of illustration it makes sense to assess some of these
directives with regard to their labor market effects.
1. Some of the directives express Europe’s striving for solidarity and the effort to grasp and
formulate this into a common doctrine. An integration of the CEECs implies a common and
uniform attitude towards the interpretation of a ‘European labor market and social politics’,
from this point of view. The directives include several regulations, which are separately and
from a legal point of view not yet specific enough to be acutely employment-endangering, but
force the member countries to a common lower bound for ‘conditions of work’ (Belke 1998,
p. 220).
2. Several directives, however, create seriously employment-endangering labor market
rigidities while simultaneously protecting the employed insiders from the ‘rich’ EU-countries
against the competition by employees from the ‘poorer’ member countries (Burda 1998, p.
18). The implementation of the Social Charter is obviously carried out more pressingly, the
closer the entry date of the CEECs becomes. The EU Commission launched a whole series of
suggestions in March 1998 in order to enlarge the working time directive of 1993 to
employees who had been excluded so far. Furthermore, different directives expanded
vacation, pension and dismissal regulations to some so far excluded plants or divisions of
enterprises (Burda 1998, p. 18).
Directives and regulations can be seen as the attempt of some of the established EU-countries
to export labor market rigidities, i.e. significant hiring and firing costs and also higher
minimum wages, to poorer and ‘catching up’ economies. This view is of special importance
with respect to the topic of our paper. Originally, poorer countries offer a more competitive
production environment because of lower labor costs and lower standards of living.
Established EU members accept that unemployment will be high and lasting in the CEECs
after their accession to prevent wages and social standards in the EU from being ‘eroded’.
2.3 Status quo and future scenarios of the labor markets of the CEECs
The future dynamics of labor market performance in the CEECs will still differ from the EU
to a certain extent, mainly for the following reasons. First, the transformation recession
determined by special factors like the collapse of the former Soviet Union and connected with
fiscal and balance of payment problems, wars in the Gulf and above all in the Balkans region
still prevents the recovery of labor demand (path dependence; problems of hysteresis). To this
extent, the CEECs resemble East Germany. Second, job elimination and job creation in the
CEECs are connected by endogenous feedback because of fiscal policy (fiscal trap). A– 5 –
particular feature of the CEECs as compared to the EU economies is the fact that the state lost
a major share of its sources of income due to the transformation and the take-over of large
parts of the economies by private owners and managers. For political and economic reasons,
this led either directly or indirectly, via contributions to different social funds to an increase in
the taxation of labor. Since this kind of duty can strictly be collected more easily than the
usual value-added or the income tax, the governments of the CEECs have become
increasingly dependent on these revenues in the recent past. When the financial burdens of
unemployment insurance and benefits became pressingly high in the course of transition, and
as a consequence tax revenues diminished (above all in Hungary and Poland), the taxation of
labor and thus the non-wage labor costs rised again as a reaction. This lowered the demand for
labor further, which led to the dynamic instability of the whole system. For the CEECs, in
contrast to analysis for the OECD (Nickell and Bell 1997), a significant and negative impact
of the taxation of labor on employee-employer relationships cannot be rejected empirically.
Employment in these countries often fell into the so-called fiscal trap, i.e. into an equilibrium
with excessive taxation and tax evasion. In this connection, the emergence of a
comprehensive shadow economy as an evasive action with respect to the increasing taxation
of labor can be seen as typical of the CEECs (Boeri et al. 1998, p. 86; Burda 1998, p. 10). In
this respect, the CEECs are strongly similar to the Italian Mezzogiorno and their labor
markets are characterized by an extraordinary high need of adjustment capabilities (Belke
and Hebler 2000).
By now, the labor markets in the CEECs resemble the labor markets of Western Europe in
many aspects. The search incentives caused by the wage compensation schemes in most
CEEC’s are as low as in Continental EU-member states. The employee protection legislation
in most CEECs follows the Continental European style. Particularly some rules concerning
severance pay and protection against unlawful dismissal follow Continental European models
word-for-word (Boeri et al. 1998, p. 88). As in Western Europe, inefficient active labor
market policies (ALMPs) were selected to mix-up stagnating unemployment pools.
Additionally, the mobility of workers is even lower than in Western Europe. Empirical
analysis has shown that the macroeconomic adjustment on labor markets is similar to Western
Europe due to the fact that the burden of this adjustment is mainly borne by the decision of
active participation in the labor market. As in Western Europe, the flexibility of wages so far
cannot play a prominent role in adjustment processes. Overall, thus, one can conclude that the
labor markets of the CEECs are predominantly typically Western European (Huber 1999, p.
12). Hence, the diagnosis is also one of high hiring and firing costs and on average higher
wages (“eurosclerosis”).
That is why, unfortunately from a market economist’s point of view, it can be seen as a safe
bet that the enlargement will not lead to a ‘competition of institutions’ simply because there is
no ‘trade-off’ between Western and Eastern institutions. Western institutions are a conditio
sine qua non for accession countries either via the acquis or, expressed more generally, by– 6 –
Western democratic standards. As such they are not negotiable. However, the enlargement
will most likely at the same time raise competition on several markets, including the labor
markets. Hence we feel autorized to state that “Europe as a whole is facing the same
challenge” (Franz 1995, p. 43).5
Any adverse shocks to labor markets, for example, due to competition of imports, can have
persistent consequences under these circumstances. If these shocks mainly concern small
regions they can result in local and extremely persistent unemployment. Hence, Eastern
enlargement is frequently said to imply roughly the same chances and risks for the CEECs as
for the EU15. The fast ‘return to Europe’ of the CEECs will from the beginning constitute an
integration shock for the European labor markets as a whole. To what extent this assessment
is right, will be investigated in this paper more deeply based on an explicit model. According
to our model, the relationship between institutional uncertainty and employment should be
particularly strong if the labor market is characterized by rigidities that, e.g., improve the
bargaining position of workers. Labor markets of most of the current EU members are usually
considered to be too rigid and, thus, give leeway to the functioning of the mechanism
explained in the model. Where do the candidates stand in this respect?
2.4 Are we legitimized to apply the model to the CEEC labor markets?
Can our above considerations be reconciled with current empirical evidence on institutions in
the CEECs? Riboud et al. (2002) deliver an insightful study in this respect. They attempt to
assess the flexibility of the labor market institutions in six CEE candidate countries (the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).6 According to their
findings, these countries fall somewhere in the middle of the flexibility scale compared to the
OECD economies. Though, they do not reach the level of flexibility of the UK, Ireland and
Denmark, they still exhibit much greater flexibility than the Club Med countries, France and
Germany).7 As regards the unemployment insurance systems, the CEECs seem to be less
generous than the OECD or the EU countries. They also spend less on both passive and active
employment policies. Also in terms of the role of the unions in the wage negotiation process,
                                                
5 The only limitations for our main argument might arise from the fact that employee protection legislation in
most CEECs is not yet applied as strictly as in the EU (Burda 1998, p. 15). Additionally, meaningful
exceptions for small and foreign enterprises are made and the regulation of part-time work, at least in
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, is handled in a more flexible manner than in most Western
European countries (OECD 1999, p. 57). In this respect, the CEECs are strikingly similar to Eastern
Germany in the second half of the nineties. However, it can as in the case of the ex-GDR be concluded that
currently (i.e. before accession) the labor markets of the CEECs are in general not as flexible as they should
be to achieve full employment in the near future.
6 In order to allow for a comparison with the developed economies they made use of the OECD methodology
(1999).
7 However, in terms of employment protection legislation, Slovenia belongs to those countries with the
highest degree of inflexibility. This could somewhat change if the new proposed labor code, introducing
much more flexible provisions for both permanent and temporary contracts, is approved (Boeri and Terrell
2002).– 7 –
the candidates fall somewhere in the middle of the range of the OECD countries. However,
they have extremely high payroll and also other taxes which even exceed the highest levels in
the EU and, even more important in our context, rigid employment protection legislation.
Moreover, the most important point with respect to our model is that the CEE candidate
countries generally opted for labor market institutions common in the Western Europe, which
might be on the one hand due to cultural and geographical proximity and on the other hand
driven by manifest interests of West European employer’s and associations and unions. This
clearly increases the costs of job creation and destruction and the fallback reservation wage,
i.e. the minimum wage requested by a person looking for a job and is further supported by the
fact that they are required, prior to their entry into the EU, to align their legislation with the
acquis communautaire which includes a number of provisions regarding the labor market
regulations. This kind of legislation has favored employment protection while taxing
employers heavily. Many of the rules governing labor markets in the CEECs raise labor costs,
create barriers to entry and exit, and, hence, introduce rigidities in the employment structure.
Thus, the candidate countries have introduced the similar rigidities that are troubling the EU
countries (Belke and Hebler 2001 and 2002; Riboud et al. 2002).  By this, employment
decisions in the CEECs become more similar to investment decisions as analyzed in our
model which are characterized by high sunk costs under institutional uncertainty (Riboud et
al. 2002). Hence, a main ingredient of the models of the ‘option value of waiting’ under
(institutional) uncertainty applied in this paper is valid in the case of the CEECs. Though this
might not pose many problems in the current phase of transition, besides the fact that it
amplifies the impact of institutional uncertainty, it may come to the fore once the process of
structural reform is completed.
2.5 Social Union: implications for the magnitude of institutional uncertainty,
of wages and of hiring and firing costs
It might be in the interest of present EU-members to implement an EU-style institutional set-
up of the CEEC labor markets in the future which prevent direct wage competition with the
entry countries, since the CEECs would otherwise be able to produce with significantly lower
labor costs.8 However, the resulting increase of labor costs, the emergence of the ‘option
value of waiting with the employment decision’ and the introduction of regulations and
standards will strongly reduce the attractiveness of Central and Eastern Europe for FDI as
well as the competitive ability of the CEECs in the Single Market. Hence, from this
perspective the direct transfer of EU legislation and EU-‘case law’ – the acquis – onto the
                                                
8 But why will the current EU members want to impose the Social Charter even though it will harm the new
members and will thus increase the possibility of a permanent dependence on financial transfer from the EU
budget? Are the examples of the Mezzogiorno and of Eastern Germany with their misguided funds and wage
policy not deterrent enough? Belke and Hebler (2002), pp. 325 ff., deliver a public choice analysis of why it
is rational for the EU to impose the Social charter on the CEECs.– 8 –
CEECs will be likely to reduce the economic growth of Central and Eastern European
economies and to increase unemployment rates.
A closer examination of previous arguments in the last paragraph reveals that they strongly
remind those arguments that were brought up during the discussion on the labor market
impacts of German reunification, the latter actually leading to an economic and social union
between the two German states (Jovanovic 1999, p. 493). If entry of the CEECs also implies
the adoption and implementation of the Social acquis by these countries, it seems justified to
speak of labor market impacts of an extended social union in the context of Eastern
enlargement. The flexibility of labor markets as a market co-ordination mechanism will in all
probability be limited by introducing a Social Union, if the latter manifests itself in an ex ante
harmonization and a centralization of social policy. The significant reduction of limitations
on goods and factor markets due to the enlargement is implicitly taken back partially by an
extended Social Union.
An extended European Social Union with global regulations against dismissal, (indirectly
effected) harmonization of minimum wages as well as general commitment assertions towards
collective wage agreements etc. have a tendency to cause additional unemployment in a first
step particularly in the CEECs, which have lower social standards. At the same time labor
costs tend to increase, if those employed (i.e. the ‘insiders’), do not practice sufficient wage
restraint or – as it became already very clear in the first phase of German reunification – a
high wage policy is falsely forced onto the CEECs, in order to avoid mass emigration (Sinn
1999, p. 15; Jovanovic 1999, p. 493). The incentive for wage restraint is relatively small
because of fiscal activities of the welfare state (which are anticipated by ‘insiders’) aiming at
avoiding incentives for emigration from the CEECs (‘quasi full employment warranty’, public
employment or income transfers without work such as unemployment benefits, social welfare
assistance and regulation of early retirement) whose probability increases significantly in an
extended EU. Hence, wage costs as well as hiring and firing costs should rise significantly in
the CEECs.
However, the increase in wage rates and hiring and firing costs could at least partially be
offset by a decrease in uncertainty about the institutional setting which by itself might foster,
for instance, foreign direct investment in the CEECs. This view stands in sharp contrast to our
above interpretation that the acquis represents an unsuitable set of rules for economies which
find themselves no later than at the center of their ‘takeoff’ (Baldwin et al. 1997, p. 128).
Should we weigh the latter argument more heavily? Our formal analysis will give some
insights in a correct answer to this pressing question.– 9 –
3. A model of job destruction and creation based on the option value of waiting
3.1 The baseline model
The firm’s employment decision can be understood as an irreversible investment. Therefore,
we follow a real option approach. The following model is designed to illustrate the impacts of
uncertainty according to the ‘option value of waiting’ à la Pindyck (1988, 1991), Dixit (1989),
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Krugman (1989), pp. 52 ff. The firm’s employment
opportunity corresponds to a call option on a common stock. This option gives the firm the
right to employ (invest), hiring costs being the exercise price of the option, and to obtain a
‘project’. The value of this project is affected by stochastic shocks. The option itself is
valuable, and exercising the employment investment “kills” the option. Therefore the loss of
the option value has to be covered by future profits. Analogously, disinvestment (firing) can
be interpreted as a put option (Krugman, 1989, p. 53; Pindyck, 1991, p. 1133). The same logic
applies in this case.
Assume a price-taking firm which produces one unit9 of a final product, with the unit wage
costs w being the price of labor input. Selling on the market, the firm receives the unit
revenue (price) p. The interest cost of non-firm specific real capital per unit of output incurred
by the firm is represented by i times K. The “gross” profit of the firm in period t (if active),
without consideration of hiring and firing costs, is:10
(1) Ra,t = pt – it ⋅  K – wt     (if active) ,      otherwise     Rp,t = 0     (if passive)
with: t : time index
Ra,t : gross profit of the firm in period t (if active)
pt : unit revenue (price)
wt : unit wage costs
it : interest rate
K : real capital per unit of output (non-firm specific)
In the following we often – if not necessary for reasons of clarity – suppress the time index t
for reasons of parsimony.
It is assumed that some hiring costs H (including training costs) must be spent at the moment
the entry (i.e. the job creation) is executed.11 Analogously, the firm has to pay firing costs F at
the time it leaves the market (e.g. severance pay in the case of job destruction). If it later
decides to re-enter the market, the entire hiring costs must be repaid. If the firm is inactive for
                                                
9 By this, we follow a very general approach: Imagine an institutional firm as divided into single production
units, so that every unit is represented individually. We do not restrict the structure of the costs between
these units. Moreover, via this fictitious disaggregation our calculation can represent a totally new erection
as well as an enlargement of employment by an institutional firm.
10 See Belke and Göcke (1994) for a related model of labor demand. Here the reaction of only a single firm is
analyzed. However, for aggregation the heterogeneity effects are especially important (see Belke and Göcke
1998). For empirical evidence of heterogeneity for Italian manufacturing firms see Guiso and Parigi (1997).
11 Investment in employment that takes ‘time to build’ does even magnify the effect of uncertainty (see
Pindyck 1988, p. 973; Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 46 ff).– 10 –
only one period, the staff must be completely re-set up and the hiring costs must be paid
anew. Specific investments in new employees close to the production process may partly be
irreversible because of market regulation and institutional arrangements.12 In our model
switching the state of activity leads to a complete depreciation of hiring respectively firing
costs.13 Thus H and F have to be regarded as sunk costs ex post (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 8;
Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Dornbusch 1987, pp. 7 ff.).
3.2 One-off uncertainty and the possibility of waiting
3.2.1 The implication of uncertainty and the option value of waiting
In order to demonstrate the effects of uncertainty and of the “option to wait” on job creation
and destruction we have to introduce uncertainty in our model. Focusing on employment
impacts of uncertainty, we take up an idea originally proposed by Dornbusch (1987), pp. 8 f.,
Dixit (1989), p. 624, fn. 3, and Pindyck (1991), p. 1111. In order reveal the underlying
economics we prefer simple instead of advanced dynamic programming tools. Thus, as a
simplification, we explicitly model only a one-time stochastic shock as a generator of the
option value of waiting. Modeling ongoing uncertainty would be more realistic, however, the
qualitative effects of uncertainty on hiring and firing triggers would not change (but the
quantitative impact of uncertainty would even be amplified compared to our result).14
The future gross profit of the firm is now regarded as stochastic. For simplicity reasons, we
abstract from additional uncertainty over H and F. We suppose a non-recurring single
stochastic change in the profit R, which can be either positive (+u) or negative (–u) (with
u ≥≥≥≥  0, mean preserving spread).15 For simplicity reasons, both realizations of the shock do
have the same probability of ½ :
(2) Ra,t+1 = Ra,t ±  u     ⇒     Et(Ra,t+1) = Ra,t
Without the option to wait with the hiring/firing decision, the relevant alternative strategies
are to enter/hire or not for a previously inactive firm respectively to exit/fire or not for a
formerly active firm. Under uncertainty and the feasibility to delay, the option to wait and to
make the respective decision (i.e. entry or exit) in the future has to be taken into account as a
third alternative. The option to hire in the future (and not now-or-never) is valuable because
the future value of the ‘asset’ obtained by employment project is uncertain. If its value will
                                                
12 In this paper a specific investment is analyzed. However, one has to distinguish general investment, which
enables the firm to cope with different future situations. Thus the latter type may be positively correlated
with uncertainty (see e.g. Gros 1987).
13 A firm may have the option to produce or not to produce with an existing “project” (operating option,
Pindyck 1988, p. 970, p. 982). Our firm does not dispose of this option, since already one period of inaction
leads to complete depreciation of the “employment project”.
14 Explicitly modeling only a single stochastic shock (instead of permanent uncertainty) results in the
applicability of very simple algebraic methods instead of using dynamic programming techniques as
described by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pp. 95 ff.
15 This kind of binomial stochastic process was introduced into option pricing by Cox et al. (1979).– 11 –
decrease, the firm will not need to enter. This limits the risk downwards and thus generates
the inherent value of the option (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 9 and pp. 15 ff.; Krugman 1989,
p. 53).
The stochastic shock “u” comprises all  components of uncertainty one could think of as
relevant for the gross profits R of the firms. These components can be traced back directly to
(unexpected) movements of the price, of labor and capital costs and also indirectly to the still
indetermined institutional environment.16 In practice, uncertainty inherent in the institutional
environment means uncertainty with respect to future profits. Hence, institutional uncertainty
induces uncertainty about future returns and is approximated by the latter in our model.
Following this line of reasoning, a more certain institutional environment implies lower
institutional uncertainty and, thus, a smaller absolute realization of ± u, i.e., of the
“comprehensive uncertainty measure”.
3.2.2 Potential job creation: unemployed (i.e. passive) in the preceding period
A previously inactive firm has to decide whether to create a job now (instantaneous entry) or
to stay passive, including the option to hire later. It may be advantageous for the firm to
dispense with transient period t gains, if future losses are possible, since the firm can avoid
the danger of an “overhasty” entry – which later may turn out to be the wrong decision – via a
wait-and-see-strategy. The firm preserves the possibility of internalizing future gains by the
option to enter in the next period t+1 if the future profit opportunities will turn out to be
favorable (+u). Moreover, by further staying passive the firm can avoid future losses if the
profit change will be negative (–u). In the following, we abstract from the possibility to re-exit
(for this see Belke and Göcke 1999, the results do not change qualitatively). Moreover, we
assume instantaneous entry if conditions are favorable.
A firm which currently enters the market and will continue its activity will gain the period t
“gross” profit Ra,t. Since it expects the same profit for the whole infinite future the present
value of annuity due of future profits under activity from period t+1 on is
δ  ⋅  Va,t+1 = δ  ⋅  (p – i⋅ K – w)/(1 – δ ) . The discount factor is defined as  δ  ≡  1/(1 + i)  with a risk free
interest rate i; i.e.  (1 – δ ) = δ  ⋅  i  is the rate of interest costs. The entire expected net present
value of an instantaneous entry is:
                                                
16 I.e. the “comprehensive” variation described by the stochastic change u comprises all the expected effects of
changes of the price level and of unit labor and capital costs on the variation of the expected unit profit
(which is calculated as the difference of the former).– 12 –
(3) Et(V
entry
t ) = – H + Ra,t + δ  ⋅  Va,t+1 = – H + 
p – i⋅ K – w
1 – δ
with:   Et(Ra,t+1) = Ra,t = p – i⋅ K – w
H :  sunk hiring / investment costs
δ  ≡  
1
1 + i :  discount factor   ⇔    i = 
1 – δ
δ     ⇔    (1 – δ ) = δ⋅ i = 
i
1 + i      (with:  i > 0  ⇔   δ  < 1 )
Va,t+1  :  present value of annuity due in period t+1 of future revenues of an active firm
The expected present value of a waiting in period t is defined as the probability weighted
average of the present values of both stochastic u-realizations. In the case of a (+u)-
realization, the firm will use its option to hire in the future period t+1 causing sunk costs H,
and the present value is:
(4) Rp,t – δ  ⋅  H + δ  ⋅  Va,t+1 = 0 – δ  ⋅  H + δ  ⋅  
p + u – i⋅ K – w
1 – δ
Conditional on a (–u)-realization the firm will continue to stay passive:
Rp,t + δ  ⋅  Vp,t+1 = 0 + δ  ⋅  0 = 0 . Consequently, the expected net present value of a wait-and-see
strategy of a firm which is previously inactive is:
(5) Et(V
wait
t ) = – 
1
2
 ⋅  δ  ⋅  H + 
1
2
 ⋅  δ  ⋅  
p + u – i⋅ K – w
1 – δ
The value of possessing the flexibility to make the employment decision later rather than to
employ either now or never, can be calculated as the difference between the two expected net
present values:
(6) OV(pt, u) = Et(V
wait
t ) – Et(V
entry
t )          with:  
∂ OV
∂ pt
 < 0  ,   
∂ OV
∂ u
 > 0  .
An increase in the size of uncertainty u enlarges the value of the option to employ later. A
higher size of the shock enlarges the potential payoff of the option, leaving the downside
payoff unchanged, since the firm will not exercise the hiring option if the profit falls (Dixit
and Pindyck 1994, pp. 39 f.).
The firm is indifferent between both, instantaneous entry in the current period t or a wait-and-
see strategy, if  Et(V
entry
t ) = Et(V
wait









 ⋅  K + w + (1 – δ ) ⋅  H + 
δ  ⋅  u
2 – δ   =  i⋅ K + w + 
i
1 + i
 ⋅  H + 
u
1 + 2 i
Note that, on the one hand, the “variable” and non-sunk unit costs correspond to the interest
costs on the non-firm specific real capital stock K and to the wage costs w. On the other hand,
the interest costs on sunk costs (1 – δ ) ⋅  H and the coverage of the option value of waiting
u
1 + 2 i  becomes relevant. The central result here is that the entry trigger exceeds the “variable”– 13 –
unit costs, since additionally the sunk costs and the option value of waiting have to be covered
by the unit revenue.
Simplifying, assuming the absence of interest rate changes (di = 0) and of changes in the
capital input (dK = 0), the total differential with respect to the indifference-/trigger-condition
in eq. (7) can be calculated as follows:17
(8) dp
u
entry = dw + 
i
1 + i
 ⋅  dH + 
du
1 + 2 i.
From this indifference/trigger condition based on eq. (7) we can derive some expressions for a
bilateral compensation of the effects of changes of in each case two variables (similar to a
kind of “marginal rate of substitution”). Indifference between instantaneous hiring and





dH  = 1 – δ  = 
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du  = 
dw(entry)
– du  = 
δ
2 – δ  = 
1








(1 – δ ) ⋅  (2 – δ ) = 
– ( 1 + i )









1 – δ  = 
– (1 + i)
i
3.2.3 Potential job destruction: employed (i.e. active) in the preceding period
In the exit (i.e. firing and job destruction) case we abstract from the possibility to re-entry (for
this see Belke and Göcke 1999). If a previously active firm exits and fires its staff in the
current period t, it has to bear sunk firing or disinvestment costs F. As a result the firm will
get zero current and future gains (Rp,t = 0 and Vp,t+1 = 0) and therefore the present value of an
instantaneous exit can be written as:
(10) Rp,t + δ  ⋅  Vp,t+1 – F = – F
In an uncertain environment a previously active firm has to decide whether to leave the
market now (instantaneous exit) or to stay active, including the option to leave later. It may be
advantageous for the firm to bear temporary losses in the current period, if there is a chance of
future gains. In this case the active firm can avoid superfluous exit and re-entry costs. On the
one hand the firm takes into account the possibility of future gains if the future profit will turn
out to be favorable (+u). On the other hand, in the case of a negative profit change (–u) the
firm can avoid future losses via a future exit in t+1.
                                                
17 In this paper we only analyze the effects of a social union on the hiring and firing decisions in the new
member countries. Further effects of the general process of European integration are not included. E.g., the
integration of capital markets and the better access to European capital markets by CEEC firms may result
in a reduction of unit capital costs (di < 0). The reduction of European trade barriers and the cancellation of
tariffs due to the Single European market may result in a higher unit revenues of the CEEC firms (dp > 0).
Hence, these further effects of European integration are expected to increase the (expected) profits and with
this will have a positive effect on job creation and a negative one on job destruction.– 14 –
The expected present value of a waiting strategy is defined as the probability-weighted
average of the present values of both u-realizations. Conditional on the negative (–u)-
realization the firm will use its option to fire in t+1 causing sunk costs F and the present value
is:
(11) Ra,t – δ  ⋅  F + δ  ⋅  Vp,t+1 = p – 
1 – δ
δ
 ⋅  K – w – δ  ⋅  F
In the case of a favorable (+u)-realization the firm will continue its activity:
(12) Ra,t + δ  ⋅  Va,t+1 = p – 
1 – δ
δ
 ⋅  K – w + δ  ⋅  
p + u – 
1 – δ
δ
 ⋅  K – w
1 – δ




t ) = p – 
1 – δ
δ
 ⋅  K – w – 
1
2
 ⋅  δ  ⋅  F + 
1
2
 ⋅  δ  ⋅  
p + u – 
1 – δ
δ
 ⋅  K – w
1 – δ
The present value of an immediate exit is simply given by sunk firing costs F:
(14) Et(V
exit
t ) = V
exit
t  = – F
Hence, the firm is indifferent between an exit in t and ‘wait-and-see’ if  Et(V
exit
t ) = Et(V
wait
t ) .








 ⋅  K + w – (1 – δ ) ⋅  F – 
δ  ⋅  u
2 – δ  = i⋅ K + w – 
i
1 + i
 ⋅  F – 
u
1 + 2 i
Assuming (ceteris paribus) the absence of changes of the interest rate (di = 0) and of the
capital input (dK = 0), the total differential with respect to the indifference-/trigger-condition
in eq. (15) can be written as follows:
(16) dp
u
exit = dw – 
i
1 + i
 ⋅  dF – 
du
1 + 2 i
From this indifference/trigger condition based on eq. (16) we can derive some expressions for
the bilateral compensation of the effects of changes of in each case two variables. Indifference





dF  = – (1 – δ ) = 
– i




du  = 
dw(exit)
– du  = 
– δ
2 – δ  = 
– 1








(1 – δ ) ⋅  (2 – δ ) = 
– ( 1 + i )









1 – δ  = 
1 + i
i– 15 –
3.3 Position and width of the ‘band of inaction’ under uncertainty
Due to the sunk hiring costs H, the unit revenue which is sufficient to induce an entry is larger
than the variable costs. And due to sunk firing costs F only a price sufficiently below the
variable costs leads to an exit. Combining both trigger values, a 'band of inaction' results (see
Fig. 1). The latter implies that the current realization of the unit revenue pt is not sufficient to
determine the current state of the firm’s activity. Depending on the past state of activity, the
relationship between profit or price and present state of activity is represented by different
curves. In order to select one of the multiple equilibria, the history has to be regarded; i.e. we
have a situation with hysteresis.
Under uncertainty the entry (exit) trigger price is additively (subtractively) augmented by the
term  
du
1 + 2 i . Thus, via option value effects of waiting, uncertainty leads to an expansion of
the ‘band of inaction’. Uncertainty increases the probability that a firm stays active (passive)
if the current level of the profit has descended (ascended) from a formerly high (low) level
that in the past had induced an entry (exit). In our oversimplified model the expansion of the
‘band of inaction’ is even linear and separable with respect to the anticipated absolute size u
of the shock. Furthermore, in this simple set up the expansion is even independent of any
aspects of heterogeneity concerning the variable and the sunk costs of the firm.18

































i F ⋅ –––
                                                
18 Of course, these simple mathematical characteristics are a result of our simplifying assumptions, concerning
the inclusion of a re-entry or re-exit and of explicitly only analyzing a one-off stochastic shock. In a more
general setting, the direction of the option value effect would remain, however the impact of uncertainty on
the ‘band of inaction’ would not be linear-separable.– 16 –
4. Scenario of EU Eastern enlargement:
impacts on job creation and job destruction
In order to derive the impacts of Eastern Enlargement and the adoption of a European Social
Union on job creation and destruction in the CEECs, we have to take into account and to
weight against each other the following direct implications of the change in the institutional
framework.
•  dH, dF > 0 , i.e., an increase of hiring and firing costs due to the adoption of social and labor
market policy institutions of the acquis. In section 2, we argued that directives and regulations
of the acquis can be seen as the attempt of some of the established EU-countries to export
labor market rigidities, i.e. significant hiring and firing costs and also higher minimum
wages, to poorer and ‘catching up’ economies which originally offered a more competitive
production environment because of lower labor costs and lower standards.
•  dw > 0 , i.e., increasing wages due to, e.g., higher unionization, harmonization of minimum
wages, general commitment assertions towards collective wage agreements and a higher
reservation wage due to an extended welfare state as well as higher taxes on labor (in order to
finance the welfare state).
•  du < 0 , i.e., a negative effect of diminished institutional uncertainty on the variation of
expected profits due to the adoption of the acquis. Note that in section 2 we argued that the
CEECs urgently need market economy rules in order to remove the prevailing legal
uncertainty which currently restrains investment. Hence, the transfer of a set of rules such as
the acquis might be interpreted as a reliable obligation to the transformation process. This was
defined by us as the elimination of institutional uncertainty.
While dH > 0 leads to less job creation, dF > 0 hampers job destruction. The reduction in
institutional uncertainty du < 0 tends to lead to more job creation and more job destruction
simultaneously. It cannot be determined a priori which effect dominates. However, the
increase of wages dw > 0 causes less job creation and more job destruction. In other words,
four out of six primary impacts tend to have a negative impact on labor market performance
in the CEECs. These relationships are summarized graphically in Fig. 2.– 17 –
Fig. 2: Three selected effects of EU Eastern enlargement on price triggers










job destruction job creation
pt
dw > 0 dw > 0
du < 0 du < 0
dF > 0 dH > 0
unit
more job destruction less job creation
less job destruction less job creation
more job destruction more job creation
Given the trigger conditions in eqs. (8) and (16), we can derive conditions under which the
total effect of enlargement on job creation and destruction in the CEECs is unambiguous.
Job-creation is fostered insofar as the hire trigger value of the unit revenue in eq. (8) is





entry < 0    ⇔     dw + 
i
1 + i
 ⋅  dH < 
– du
1 + 2 i
The stronger the increase of wages is and the higher the interest costs of the sunk hiring costs
become, the lower the number of jobs created. The more institutional uncertainty is
eliminated, the higher the rate of job creation.
However, job-destruction is promoted exactly if enlargement results in an increase of the fire





exit > 0     ⇔     dw + 
– du
1 + 2 i >  
i
1 + i
 ⋅  dF
The stronger the increase of wages and the more institutional uncertainty shrinks, the more
jobs are eliminated. However, the higher the firing costs become, the less probable is job
destruction.
Summarizing, a reduction of uncertainty by the adoption of a well-tried and tested
institutional framework, i.e. of the acquis, on the one hand fosters structural change since it
leads at the same time to more job-creation and more job-destruction. However, one has to
work on the assumption that rigidities increase, for instance by an increase of the (sunk) costs
H and F. Ceteris paribus, the latter leads to a widening of the ‘band of inaction’ and, thus,
preserves given structures. However, it cannot be determined a priori which effect dominates.
The higher the interest rates are, the more probable is a bias towards the status-quo –– 18 –
according to our simple model. The probable increase of the wage costs effects an upward
movement of the band of inaction. This means an amplification of job-destruction, but at the
same time a mitigation of job-creation. Moreover, it once again elucidates the danger of a
“Mezzogiorno” respectively of a “German unification” effect, i.e. a strong decline of jobs and
high unemployment induced by excessive wage costs.19
5. Simulation exercises: Graphical illustration of the trade-offs
In order to convey an idea of the impacts of the underlying model and to illustrate our results,
we calculate a simple numerical example. The unit labor costs are normalized to unity (w = 1)
and as a standard example we take the short-term interest rate given as i = 0.1 = 10%.
In the case of the following initial values, we are able to calculate the trigger prices from eqs.
(7) and (15) and the bilateral trade-offs corresponding to eqs. (9) and (17):
  - non-specific real capital: K = 5
  - absolute size of uncertainty: u = 0.2
  - sunk hire/fire costs: H = F = 1
  - non-specific real capital: K = 5
    ⇒ p
u
entry = 1.757575 ,  p
u
exit = 1.242424













du  = 
 – dw(entry)




du  = 
dw(exit)
du  = 0.833333




dH  = 
– dH




dF  = 
dF
dw = 0.090909
                                                
19 As stated in fn. 17, a European integration of capital markets may lead to lower interest rates in the CEEC.
This would have two further effects on the ‘band of inaction’. The reduction of unit capital costs will result
in a leftward shift of the center of the band (i.e. more job creation and less job destruction). Since sunk
(dis)investments are incorporated into the firm’s calculus via their interest costs, a reduction of the interest
rate will lead to a decreasing width of the band on both sides (i.e. structural change is fostered via more job
creation and more job destruction). Thus, integration of capital markets may (partly) compensate the effects
of the social union outlined above and thus will reduce the danger of a “Mezzogiorno / Eastern Germany”
scenario.– 19 –
Fig. 3: “Partial indifference trade-off” on job creation between a change of hiring costs (dH)
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The comments on Fig. 3 are quite straightforward. Above the indifference line, the increase of
sunk hiring costs dH has a stronger impact than reduction of uncertainty (–du). Hence job
created is impeded in this area. Below the indifference line the reduction of uncertainty
dominates and job creation is fostered in this area. As a consequence, a higher interest rate
tends to lower job creation.
Fig. 4: “Partial indifference trade-off” on job destruction between
a change of firing costs (dF) and the reduction of uncertainty (–du)
(if dw = dp
u
exit = 0)   
dF
du = 
– ( 1 + i )
i ⋅  ( 1 + 2 i )
du
















The comments on Fig. 4 are analogous to the comments on Fig. 3. Above the indifference
line, the increase of sunk firing costs dF has a stronger impact than the reduction of
uncertainty (–du). Hence job destruction is impeded in this area. Below the indifference line
the reduction of uncertainty dominates and job destruction is fostered in this area.
Note that the reduction of uncertainty fosters structural change by at the same time supporting
job creation and job destruction. The net effect on total economy labor demand is ambiguous
a priori, since these two effects are counteracting each other. Moreover, the interest rate is
quite important for the trade-off, since sunk investments are incorporated into the firm’s
calculus via their interest costs.
Fig. 5: “Partial indifference trade-off” on job creation between a
change in unit labor costs (dw) and the reduction of uncertainty (–du)
dependent on different realizations of the interest rate
(if dH = dp
u
entry = 0)   
dw(exit)
du  = 
– 1
1 + 2 i
du


















Comment on Fig. 5: the negative impact of the wage increase on the degree of job creation
can be compensated by a reduction of the option value of waiting in the wake of the lowering
of uncertainty. The higher the reduction of uncertainty is, the more job creation takes place.– 21 –
Fig. 6: “Partial indifference trade-off” on job destruction between the change in unit labor
costs (dw) and the reduction of uncertainty (–du)
(if dF = dp
u
exit = 0)   
dw(exit)
du  = 
1

















Comment on Fig. 6: If unit labor costs increase (dw > 0) this fosters job destruction. This
effect could be compensated by a increase in uncertainty. However, since according to section
2, an increase of unit labor costs in the CEECs is a highly probable scenario, more job
destruction should be observed in the CEECs after enlargement. Thus we predict a situation in
the north-western quadrant of Fig. 6 where job destruction is boosted.
Fig. 7: “Three-dimensional indifference trade-off” for the entry/hiring trigger condition
between the change in unit labor costs (dw), the reduction of uncertainty (–du)
and the change of the sunk hiring costs (dH)
dp
u
entry = 0    ⇔     dw = 
– du




 ⋅  dH
























Comment on Fig. 7: Below the depicted “indifference plane”, the pu
entry-trigger is lowered.
Hence, hiring increases in this area. However and with the same logic, hiring diminishes for
any point above the indifference plane. Since we forecast a reduction of uncertainty and at the– 22 –
same time an increase of the (sunk) hiring and firing costs alongside with wage increases, it
cannot be said a priori whether the case of the CEECs after the adoption of the acquis
corresponds to a location below or above the indifference area.
Fig. 8: “Three-dimensional indifference trade-off” for the exit/firing trigger condition
between the change in unit labor costs (dw), the reduction of uncertainty (–du) and the
change of the sunk firing costs (dF)
dp
u
exit = 0    ⇔     dw =  
i
1 + i
 ⋅  dF + 
du
1 + 2 i
























Comment on Fig. 8: Above the indifference plane pu
exit increases. Thus, the extent of job
destruction is higher in this area. In contrast, existing jobs are “protected” in the area below
the indifference space. Jobs are destroyed to a lower extent.
Here, we assume a reduction of uncertainty and at the same time an increase of wage costs,
which promotes job destruction. However, this scenario is contrasted with a stronger
protection of existing jobs by an increase of the firing costs. Hence, also in this case the final
effect is a priori not exactly identified. Since two effects work into the same direction it can
be assumed to be more realistic than in the above hiring scenario (depicted in Fig. 7) to
assume a position above the indifference plane. In other words and seen on the whole, the
tendency towards job destruction may be stronger than the one towards job creation. As a
consequence, a “Mezzogiorno/Eastern Germany” scenario would be the result.20
6. Conclusions
In this paper, the opportunities and risks of the Eastern enlargement for the labor markets of
the CEECs have been pointed out. We added structure to our arguments by explicitly
addressing the role of reduced institutional uncertainty and at the same time increased
                                                
20 However, see the caveats as expressed in fn. 19.– 23 –
significance of hiring and firing costs and higher wages in general by means of the theory of
the option value of waiting.
In our highly stylized study, we ascribed the revenue volatility partly to institutional
uncertainty. The logic behind this becomes clear immediately if one takes into account that
social and labor market policy regulations might well feed back to labor costs and thus also to
the revenues of a representative firm in the CEECs. The effect of institutional uncertainty on
the revenue was additively included in the revenue function. Moreover, the relation between
employment and all its driving forces is affected by institutional uncertainty. We focused on
the calculation of new unit revenue triggers, initially holding other determinants of
employment constant. Later on, we broadened our perspective and additionally took into
account that the adoption of the acquis might lead to an enhancement of hiring and firing
costs and of wage rates in the CEECs.
Similarly, one could calculate trigger values for, e.g., wage rates, resulting in a hysteresis
band concerning wages. According to our results, due to institutional uncertainty,
employment can be expected to be less sensitive than previously expected to movements in its
causing variables like unit revenues and wage rates.
Based on the results of our model, we feel justified to derive some definitive statements on
the impact of eliminating institutional uncertainty by the adoption of the acquis
communautaire on job creation and job destruction in the CEEC candidate countries. Under
the assumption of a net reduction of institutional uncertainty (i.e. abstracting from additional
uncertainty appearing elsewhere) and from a macroeconomic perspective, the expected
employment impacts of the adoption of the acquis are twofold. Lowering uncertainty will
compress the firms’ bands of inaction, via higher firing and lower hiring triggers. Gains in
employment resulting from the adoption of the acquis will be confined to firms with new
employment potentials near to the entry trigger, where lowering the entry trigger will result in
hiring. Contrarily, due to the increase of the exit trigger, firms which tend to dismissals will
actually lay off some of their staff. This implies that structural change tends to be fostered via
the adoption of the acquis which reduces institutional uncertainty. Extrapolating our micro
results to the macro level, CEECs (sectors) like Poland with a large part of its labor force still
belonging to the agricultural sector with a current tendency to reduce their workforce (i.e.
having already passed a large part of the play-area of inaction), may experience an enhanced
rate of employment reduction due to the adoption of the acquis. On the other hand, countries
with recovering labor markets may expect an employment boom.
Furthermore, the implementation of the acquis increases hiring and firing costs in the CEECs.
This leads to a widening of the ‘band of inaction’ and, thus, preserves given structures.
However, it cannot be determined a priori which effect dominates. The probable increase of
the wage costs effects an upward movement of the band of inaction. This means an
amplification of job-destruction, but at the same time a mitigation of job-creation. Moreover,
it once again elucidates the danger of a “Mezzogiorno” respectively of a “German– 24 –
unification” effect, i.e. a strong decline of jobs and high unemployment induced by excessive
wage costs.
The integral message of our investigation should be clear. When deciding on adopting the
labor market institutions of the EU, the CEECs have to take account of their extraordinary
high needs of adjustment capabilities. While the accession to the EU will certainly induce
(and – by association procedures – has already induced) significant subjective gains, it also
will cause the additional burden of economic restructuring. The necessary process of
restructuring itself can be put at risk by a too early accession if the latter is accompanied by
the need of a strict implementation of the EU labor market institutions. The reason is that in
this case costs are implied which are for the most part due to reduced adjustment capabilities
of the labor markets of the CEECs. These huge real costs have to be added to the financial
burden of the implementation of the acquis. While the latter are usually reviewed in the public
as the main cost components of the Eastern enlargement of the EU, the former are missing in
the usual cost-benefit analysis of enlargement.
From this point of view, it would be a serious fault to adopt the Continental European labor
market rigidities, specially concerning small and medium enterprises as well as the shadow
economy (Baldwin et al. 1997, p. 128; Bell and Mickiewicz 1999; Burda 1998, p. 22). One
should always remind that accession will lead to an intensive restructuring connected with
increased labor shedding in shrinking and accelerated job creation in growing sectors in the
CEECs. Hence, policies which tend to increase the intra-industrial and regional mobility of
workers should play an important role in the wake of accession. A decentralization of wage
bargaining might be one possible kind of such a policy as well as an adequate duration and
magnitude of unemployment benefits (Belke and Hebler 2000; Biffl 1998, p. 1; Boeri 1998, p.
2).
What do our results mean for the labor market effects of Eastern enlargement? We recognize
substantial dangers for the labor market development in the CEECs by the inevitable adoption
of inefficient European Union regulations of social and labor policy via the acquis. As the
Italian Mezzogiorno and East German experiences have shown, one danger arises from
institutional reforms which depress an already lower level of social capability for growth in
the CEECs by allowing greater interference by politicians and lobbies in the allocation of
public funds. Although the adoption of the acquis might itself reduce institutional uncertainty,
the efficiency characteristics of the transferred institutions could be such that they could breed
a rent-seeking culture. The current misappropriations of EU funds by officials in Poland and
Slovenia have been first enlightening experiences in this direction. The to a certain extent
negative results of our stylized analysis for the CEEC labor markets not at least with respect
to a significant increase of hiring and firing costs and wages, clearly correspond with the
skepticism predominating up to now in the population of the CEECs concerning EU
integration. In our mind, nothing but the exposure of the dangers makes a rational discussion
of these rather important policy issues possible. However, our results and their interpretation– 25 –
by us should not to be taken as an argument against the integration of Eastern Europe. Instead
they make it clear that the integration method designated at present has substantial costs – at
least for the labor markets in the acceding countries.
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